Governance
Fxdx intends to establish a decentralized governance system that will serve as a solid foundation for the protocol's long-term growth and development. Fxdx token is designed to be the central instrument in this system, as it will have control over Fxdx's strategic direction and decentralized treasury, as well as a claim on the protocol's earnings.
The intentions of fxdx are to establish a decentralized governance system, which will serve as a solid foundation for the protocol's long-term growth and development. fxdx token is designed to be the central instrument in this system, as it will have control over fxdx's strategic direction. In addition to decentralized treasury, as well as a claim on the protocol's earnings.
The goal of network governance in fxdx is to offer on-chain governance for the key functions required to develop and sustain high-quality, well-functioning markets within a decentralized setting. Rather than to replace all other kinds of governance within the fxdx ecosystem.
Governance by fxdx has no access to user funds under any circumstances.
Governance by fxdx has control over the following major actions:
  • Governance can halt the capacity to swap assets in vAMM pool temporarily (the ability to remove liquidity is unaffected). This is intended to protect liquidity providers from potential financial harm, in the event of unforeseen pool behavior.
  • Vault's settlement can be temporarily paused by governance. This feature primarily addresses external oracle faults in which pricing data does not accurately represent market conditions.
  • Determine the Protocol Fee for collateral used to mint derivatives.

Unlisted Instruments

The open market in Fxdx can be proposed for any unlisted instruments. A proposal must specify the tradable instrument, including product, product parameters, risk model, risk parameters, trading mode, and market parameters. In addition to the size of the participant's market-making commitment, which will become their market-making stake. Proposals will be visible to all participants.
By proposing new instruments to the fxdx network, the new potential market enters the proposal period. Even if enough market-making actions are committed immediately, in orderto allow the network to ensure the market meets community standards. During which the proponent must maintain a positive amount of governance assets. The market proposal was also considered as votes in favor of market creation and a commitment to market creation. Other interested parties may vote for or against the market.

Voting by Stake Quantity

Voting by network participants based on their stake within the boundaries of the poll, is the key on-chain governance mechanism in fxdx. Stake would be quantified in terms of a participant's holding of the network's native crypto-asset. For network governance problems such as the development of a new market or the selection of network parameters (the governance asset). Stake may be quantified by the notional value of a participant's net position, their market-making stake, or a combination of both for market governance decisions.
If the crypto asset is assigned to the risk universe, it is considered that the load or transaction network is the payment network, not the participant. It cannot be counted against the vote of the participants. However, assets owned by the fxdx network but not assigned to the risk universe, are included in the stock of the participants of the voters.
For votes that require a certain level of participation (non-zero), if the minimum level of participation is not reached, the proposer will lose some of their staking assets. This measure is in place to ensure that spam proposals have a cost. Additionally ensuring that governance proposals do not create a vector for liveness attacks. In order to eliminate the incentives for various malicious behaviors such as voter bribery, it is possible to use the principle of homomorphic encryption. In addition to secure electronic election technology, to introduce secret voting for on-chain governance.

Market Closure

In rare cases, it is better to close the market rather than let it continue to trade. This can happen if the market is later discovered to be fraudulent, the external pricing source is malfunctioning, the market is seriously disrupted, or for ethical reasons. The closed market will stop operating and will immediately liquidate all open positions, opting either to settle as if the open trades had not been placed, or at the price at the time of closure. With the choice of the method proposed and voted on by market participants. Due to the severity and irrevocability of the market closure and the possibility of its impact on reputation. The majority of votes required to close the market and the minimum number of participants, will be significantly higher than the majority of the other votes.
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